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ABSTRACT 
 
Rating College Debt: A Case Study of Union College 
 Department of Economics, June 2017. 
 
Advised by: Professor Tomas Dvorak  
 
On Friday, March 3rd President Stephen Ainlay made an announcement of “the largest, 
most expensive, most complex project in Union’s history.” President Ainlay is referencing the 
massive rebirth of one of Union’s most central academic buildings, Science and Engineering. 
The three-phrase building project will take an estimated three years and cost a total of $100 
million. About $50 million of this project will be financed through debt. This comes at a time 
when, Moody’s, a top rating agency changed the methodology for rating higher education debt. 
My thesis explores the impact of the new methodology on Union’s rating. While the elimination 
of some criteria like matriculation and selectivity may help Union’s rating, the addition of other 
criteria like total wealth negatively impact Union’s standing. I find that even after including $50 
million of new debt Union should retain its A1 rating. To strengthen Union’s case for an A1 
rating I conduct a peer comparison to help Union navigate Moody’s new rating methodology. I 
also explore potential ways to structure the additional debt and discuss the pros and cons of each 
option. 
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Executive Summary  
 
Why Union’s Rating is Important 
 Union College, a small private liberal arts college located in Schenectady, NY, plans to 
issue $50 million of new money debt to partially cover the costs of a $100 million science and 
engineering building. ($40 million of the project costs will be covered by pledges and funds on 
hand, and $10 million will be an endowment for the building.)  
 The last time Union went to market was 2012. Union received a score of A1 from 
Moody’s a rating consistent with prior ratings for twenty plus years. In December of 2015, 
however, Moody’s published a new Global Higher Education rating methodology. This new 
methodology consists of four categories: Market Profile, Operating Performance, Leverage, and 
Wealth and Liquidity, given 30%, 25%, 20% and 25% weights respectively. The new 
methodology eliminated criteria like matriculation, net tuition per student, average gift per 
student, and average debt service coverage. It added new metrics like total wealth, reputation and 
pricing power, strategic positioning, leverage, and debt affordability. Understanding Moody’s 
new methodology and how it affects Union will be critical in creating a cohesive and pointed 
rating presentation to help Union achieve the highest rating possible. 
 
Union’s Preliminary Debt Rating with and Additional $50 million of Debt 
 Union’s preliminary scorecard outcome with an additional $50 million of debt added is 
4.95, which places Union’s preliminary rating in the A1 range. The A1 range spans from 4.5 to 
5.5. The new debt will directly impact financial leverage and debt affordability measured by 
spendable cash and investment to total debt, and total debt to cash flow respectively. Please see 
the scorecard below for an overview of Union’s preliminary scorecard according to FY16. 
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 The new debt also has the potential to impact a criteria under the Market Profile category, 
strategic positioning. Strategic positioning is the only qualitative factor in Moody’s new 
methodology. Therefore, since strategic positioning is a measurement of things like board 
effectiveness and successful planning, the additional debt could be perceived as risky to Union’s 
overall financial position and plan. Union should prepare to discuss their overall strategic vision, 
and the role the new S&E project plays in that vision. Additionally, Union should discuss its 
weakest metric, revenue diversity with an alphanumerical score of Baa during its rating 
presentation. I believe Union has a strong case to show Moody’s that Union has improved in this 
area and also that Union’s revenues are diverse in this area because of programmatic and 
geographic diversity. 
 
Peer Analysis  
 Bates, Franklin & Marshall (F&M), Colby, Hamilton, and Bucknell, are considered close 
peers with Union because the size of their student bodies, location in the northeast, ranking near 
Union in U.S. News and World Report rankings, and status as private not-for-profit four-year 
colleges. Bates and F&M were also most recently rated A1 by Moody’s, and Hamilton, Colby, 
and Bucknell are currently rated two-notches above Union at Aa2. The chart below overviews 
Union compared to these five peers according to FY16 based on Moody’s published scorecard. 
 Union’s strength relative to peers is driven by two key aspects of its financial statements: 
consistent increases in operating income and relatively low debt outstanding compared to peers. 
These two financial aspects drive Union to be on par with, or outperform more highly rated peer 
institutions in five factors: scope of operations, reputation and pricing power, operating results, 
operating reserve, and debt affordability. Union’s increasing operating revenue is largely 
attributed to increases in private gifts and grants, which increased 236% from FY2011 to 
FY2016. Union can explain that this was a deliberate act of strategic planning to improve its 
revenue diversity, increase funds on hand, and increase alumni giving percentages. Union’s 
lower debt outstanding and strong scores in criteria related to debt help support Union’s case that 
taking on additional debt is fiscally responsible, as well as a wise strategic move. 
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 Peer colleges rated more highly outperform relative to Union in three factors: liquidity, 
financial leverage, and total wealth. Union’s liquidity is strong at 594 days, putting it in the Aa 
alphanumerical range for this factor. Peers, however, have even better liquidity than Union, but 
this is not a major concern. Financial leverage, measured by spendable cash and investments to 
total debt, and total wealth, measured by total cash and investments, are clearly tied to one 
another. Both measurements use cash and investments. This is where Union’s smaller 
endowment is reflected in the scorecard. Union’s endowment, valued at $432 million in FY16 is 
about half the size of Hamilton, Bucknell, and Colby’s endowments at $883 million, $817 
million, and $925 million respectively. The magnitude of Union’s endowment in relation to peer 
colleges is Union’s biggest concern financially. This concern is exacerbated because Union’s 
endowment return of about -9.0% was cited by Bloomberg as the worst endowment return 
among the “little Ivies.”  
 Discussing Union’s plans to generate positive endowment returns in the future and the 
positive trends on larger scale should help mitigate the endowment concerns. Integrating positive 
aspects of Union strategic planning like its more than 16% increase in applications since 2011-
2012, strong retention rates around 93%, and differentiating factor as a liberal arts school with a 
robust engineering program. Additionally, comparing criteria where Union outperforms 
compared to peers, such as those related to operating revenue and debt affordability, will position 
Union well to maintain its prior rating of A1.   
 
Debt Structuring Recommendation 
 Although there are infinite ways to structure Union’s additional debt, I think the structure 
outlined below, or a structure that uses the same primary ideas, is the best option.  
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This structure issues $10 million of short-term debt, the maximum advised by Union’s 
underwriter. According to Union’s scheduled pledges designated for the S&E project, the 
entirety of the short-term debt principal will be offset by the pledge payments. The debt follows 
the pre-existing staircase structure (increasing principal as the maturities become longer) up to 
2029, followed by another staircase leading to the 2037 Series 2008 term bond payment. 
Lowering the debt after 2029 will leave more flexibility for future debt issues because Union 
could easily handle additional debt layered on top of the existing debt in the years 2030 and 
beyond. The remaining debt, about $15.6 million, could be issued as a long-term term bond with 
mandatory sinking fund payments. Based on recently priced higher education deals, market 
conditions for issuing term bonds are good. Haverford College, rated AA- by S&P and Fitch 
issued three large long-term term bonds with 5.0% interest rates during their debt issue on 
February 28th of this year. This further supports that Union could help keep upcoming payments 
lower by issuing a large term bond for potentially little additional cost in terms of the interest 
rate on the bond.  Therefore, this option takes Union’s current finances and pledges into 
consideration, maintains flexibility by issuing less debt in the mid years, and lowers upfront costs 
by issuing a large long-term term bond. 
 Following this executive summary is the analysis that led me to make these 
recommendations and conclusions about Union’s potential debt rating and debt structure. In the 
first chapter I review the basics of public finance, the importance of debt ratings, and the new 
rating methodologies. I use Moody’s scorecard outlined in their Global Higher Education rating 
methodology to arrive at a preliminary score of A1. In the following chapter I compare Union to 
its group of five peer institutions. After calculating their preliminary rating outcomes using the 
same process, I examine Union’s strengths and areas of concern relative to its peer group. I also 
give recommendations on how to navigate these areas of concern, including Moody’s new 
qualitative criteria, strategic positioning. Finally, I review three options for structuring Union’s 
additional debt based on a framework to achieve a balance of short-term to long-term debt, the 
best sustainability from a financial perspective, an absence of concentration of the debt, and also 
taking current market conditions into account. After reviewing some recent higher education 
deals I make a final recommendation for the debt structure of the new deal. My analysis supports 
that the S&E capital project is reasonable from a financial standpoint and should not damage 
Union’s credit even with the new rating methodology. The reinvigoration of S&E has the 
potential to better Union’s competitive edge as a liberal arts school with strong STEM programs 
without deteriorating Union’s financial position. 
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Chapter 1: Estimating a Credit Rating for Union College 
 
1.1 Background on Bonds, Municipal Bonds, and Credit Ratings 
 
 A bond is, by its most basic definition, a loan. The seller of the bond, or the “issuer,” 
pays the buyer of the bond, or the “investor,” the loan plus some stream of interest at a set date in 
the future (Law 2016). The date when the initial amount of the bond, or the principal, is paid 
back to the investor is considered the maturity of the bond. The interest rate the issuer pays on 
the bond is called the coupon. The price is determined as the present value of both the income 
stream from the interest and the amount paid back at maturity. Therefore, one method of 
determining price is adding the present value of the cash flows. Exhibit 1 describes this equation.  
Exhibit 1: Bond Pricing Equation 
𝑃 = 𝐶1 + 𝑖 +	 𝐶1 + 𝑖( + ⋯	 𝐶1 + 𝑖*	 +	 𝑀1 + 𝑖* 
In Exhibit 1, “P” is the price of the bond, “C” is the coupon payment, “i” is the interest rating, 
“M” is the principal, and “n” is the “nth” time period. 
 When a state, local government, or other certified issuer issues bonds it is considered a 
“municipal bond.” The primary difference between corporate bonds, i.e., bonds issued by 
cooperate entities, and municipal bonds is that the income stream from municipal bonds is 
normally federally tax-exempt (and frequently state and locally tax-exempt), whereas the income 
stream from cooperate bonds is taxable. Therefore, investors are willing to accept lower interest 
payments since the income stream is tax exempt, and issuers benefit because they pay lower 
interest payments on their debt. Consider, for example, two bonds: A, which is taxable, and B, 
which is tax-exempt. Let’s assume a 30% tax-bracket and that both bonds have the same 
probability of default. If bond A paid $100 a month, the real income steam is actually $70 
(because 30% of $100 is $30, leaving the investor with $70). Thus, if that same investor is 
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deciding whether to invest in a tax-exempt bond instead, any payment greater than $70 would be 
a better investment.  
 The relationship between taxable and tax-exempt bonds explains the relationship between 
the U.S. Treasury yield curve and the Municipal Market Data curve (MMD, the relevant yield 
curve in municipal issues). MMD theoretically lies below the Treasury yield curve at a rate equal 
to one’s tax rate, because investors are willing to accept lower interest payments.  
Other certified municipal issuers that are not governments are those entities that can 
claim a tax-exempt status. For example, primary education systems, higher-education systems, 
hospitals, sports arenas, and other not-for-profits can issue tax-exempt debt. The U.S. tax code 
under section 501.c3 allows for not-for-profits to issue tax-exempt debt (SIFMA 2011).   
Municipal bonds are issued for two primary reasons: to finance a new project or to 
refinance existing debt. When the bonds are issued to finance a project, i.e., a state government 
building a new highway, the bond issue is considered to be, “new money.” In the case of bonds 
refinancing old bonds, the issue is aptly called a, “refinancing” (Hoffland 1972). When the bonds 
are initially sold that is considered the “primary bond market,” whereas when the investor resells 
a bond, or trades it, this is considered the “secondary bond market” (SIFMA 2011). 
 There are two ways to sell bonds: through a competitive sale or a negotiated sale. In a 
competitive sale investors submit sealed bids to the issuer whereas in a negotiated sale, a “senior 
banker” or “lead banker” is chosen from a selection process to buy the entirety of the bond issue 
from the Issuer at such a price that the bank can then sell the bonds on the market. A negotiated 
sale offers the issuer more debt structuring flexibility and access to banking professionals who 
can introduce new ideas to financing the given project (SIFMA 2011).  
 5 
Competitive sales are less common than negotiated (Bond Buyer, 2016). The process, 
however, is arguably simpler. The issuer simply announces the sale, normally on Bond Buyer, then 
there is a period when investors place bids on the debt issue. The issuers then take whichever bids 
result in the lowest cost of capital (SIFMA 2011). 
 When any Issuer, whether it be municipal or corporate, decides to come to market, or 
issue debt, they have the option of paying for a credit rating(s) from a rating agency. These 
ratings serve as an endorsement for the debt when the rating is good, and warn investors of 
potential concern when the rating is below investment grade. Therefore, the rating agencies help 
close the problem of asymmetrical information between the sellers and the buyers (Langohor 
2016). The primary agencies are Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch. Each agency assigns 
ratings on somewhat different scales given in Exhibit 2. 
Exhibit 2: Credit Rating Scales from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch 
 
 
Therefore, the top rating, AAA or Aaa, is considered to be the most secure, or the least 
likely to default, whereas the bottom category, D or C indicates default. Since ratings are 
considered an indicator of risk, they also help determine return, or interest rate. Investors demand 
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a higher coupon on bonds that are perceived as more-risky, as compensation for the additional 
risk they are taking on. Hite and Warga (1997) found this relationship to be true in the case of 
rating downgrades (that is an issuer moving down on the rating scale). They studied issuers in 
the 12 months prior to a downgrade and in the 12 months after a downgrade, and found that 
issuers were forced to compensate investors with significantly higher interest rates after the 
downgrade as opposed to the 12 months prior. Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) found 
similar findings from their study of the announcements of downgrades from Moody’s and S&P. 
Therefore, ratings are an important aspect to consider both from an investor perspective, to 
measure risk and return, and from an issuer’s perspective to try to keep the cost of capital as low 
as possible. From this investor perspective, it is advantageous to obtain the highest rating 
possible in order to obtain the lowest cost of capital.  
1.2 Higher-Education Borrowing  
According to U.S. News and World report the average size of a College or University 
endowment in America in fiscal year 2015 was $355 million (Kowarski 2016). With access to 
funds of that magnitude, many may wonder why College and Universities issue debt via 
negotiated or competitive debt sales to finance new building projects. The basic answer is that an 
endowment is normally made up of hundreds or even thousands of smaller funds, which are 
normally designated for specific purposes (Smith 2015). Some funds are solely for financial aid, 
a specific scholarship fund, or a specific department.  These specialized funds restrict a college 
or university board from accessing enough funds to undertake large building or renovation 
projects on a college campus. Therefore, when colleges and universities cannot raise enough 
unrestricted funds, i.e., annual funds, or money specific to the project from large donors, they 
must issue debt in order to complete the project. There are also industry wide expectations to 
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maintain a sizable endowment as a cushion for times of financial stress and as an indicator of a 
long legacy and prestige. 
1.3 Tax-Exempt Debt Regulations 
            Since Colleges and Universities are in the higher-education category they are given a tax-
exempt status under the IRS code section 501 (c) (3) (SIFMA 2011). This allows colleges and 
universities the option to issue tax-exempt debt, thus obtaining a lower cost of capital. Despite 
this benefit, issuing tax-exempt debt comes with regulations and restrictions.  
The MSRB, or Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board establishes rules for issuing tax-
exempt debt. The MSRB rules are too numerous and complicated to discuss fully here. The rules 
are in fact so detailed that all negotiated deals must have an independent lawyer, called Bond 
Counsel to review the issuer to make sure it is legal (EMMA 2011). 
 Here are some of the most important regulations. Firstly, the project, or the thing the new 
debt is financing, cannot include a taxable income generating entity. For example, issuers cannot 
build a new tax-exempt study facility with rental space for a taxable coffee store in it. Secondly, 
issuers must follow the laws and regulations, as to not commit arbitrage: the issuer cannot invest 
the proceeds of the bond deal at an interest rate higher than the arbitrage yield. Thirdly, there are 
different regulations for calling tax-exempt bonds out of the market. Tax-exempt bonds can only 
be called prior to the call date period once. This is called an Advanced Refunding (MSRB 2016). 
The MSRB states under the Refunding section: 
 
In an advance refunding, the issuer sells new bonds and places the proceeds into an escrow 
account. Thus, the advance refunded bonds are not paid off immediately, but instead are paid 
off either as originally scheduled at maturity or on an earlier redemption date in the future 
according to the bonds' redemption, or "call," provisions. The Federal tax code generally 
provides that a bond issue may be advance refunded only once (although bonds issued prior to 
1986 may be advance refunded twice) 
 
The provision for only allowing one Advanced Refunding is because the bonds are essentially no 
longer a liability of the issuer since the escrow pays for the payments due on the bonds.   
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These regulations only serve as a few of the most principal examples of the complex 
regulations that must be understood and met by issuers of tax-exempt debt. These restrictions are 
an additional cost or hindrance to consider when deciding whether to issue tax-exempt or taxable 
debt.  
1.4 The Higher-Education Bond Market  
 The market for college and university debt is a significant portion of municipal debt. 
According to Bond Buyer, in 2015 the volume of long-term debt issues related to education 
(which includes all levels of education through college) was nearly $125 billion, while the entire 
dollar amount of tax-exempt issues in 2015 was $398 billion (Bond Buyer 2016). Therefore, 
education comprised 31.4% of the municipal market in 2015.  
 The market for municipal debt in the education sector increased considerably. Since 
1986, for example, the annual issue of long-term education related debt increased nearly 80.4% 
(Bond Buyer 2016). The number of annual education related deals increased 144% since 1986 
(Bond Buyer 2016).  
 Thus, it can be argued that education related debt is increasing in terms of market share 
of municipal debt since the number of issues and the magnitude of issues increased substantially.  
1.5 Introduction to New Methodologies 
 After the financial crisis of 2008 unraveled it became apparent that rating agencies were 
partially to blame for the financial disaster (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011). The 
rating agencies, like the banks had issues of moral hazard and transparency. As a result of the 
rating agencies role in the financial crisis, rating agencies are subjected to harsher regulations by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (effective 2010 (EMMA 2016). Dodd-Frank requires that rating agencies publish 
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rating methodologies so that investors, bankers, and issuers can discern how ratings are 
determined. The following describes Moody’s and S&P’s new rating methodologies for higher 
education debt (published in November 2015 and January 2016 respectively). 
1.6 Moody’s Global Higher Education Rating Methodology 
 November 23, 2015 Moody’s published a new Global Higher Education rating 
methodology. The new methodology explains Moody’s approach and criteria for rating higher-
education debt in and outside of the United States. This methodology states, “This report 
includes a scorecard that can be used to approximate credit profiles within the higher education 
sector” (Kedem 2015 p 3). It should be noted that although the scorecard provides a relatively 
good approximation for the credit risk associated with a particular issuer, and thus its credit 
rating, Moody’s reserves the right to weight other factors not listed in the methodology. Despite 
that Moody’s may consider other factors, there are four main segments Moody’s analyzes: 
Market Profile, Operating Performance, Wealth and Liquidity, and Leverage. Exhibit 3 describes 
the subcategories in each segment and the weight typically assigned to each category and the 
factors used to evaluate each category. 
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Exhibit 3: Moody’s Global Higher Education Scorecard Factors  
 
After computing each factor criteria for the most recent fiscal year, Moody’s compares each 
factor to predetermined brackets. If, for example, annual change in operating revenue is greater 
than or equal to 4%, but less than 6%, the issuer receives a rating of A for this factor which then 
corresponds to a score of 6 for this category. Thus, each factor is given an overall score, and the 
weighted average corresponds to an overall rating. The lower the overall weighted score, the 
higher the rating. 
 All factors but one from Exhibit 3 are calculated from an issuer’s annual financial 
statements. Thus, Moody’s rating methodology is focused primarily on balance sheet and income 
statement analysis. Moody’s prior higher education rating methodology took other factors about 
the school into account. For example, Moody’s old higher education methodology took other 
factors like matriculation and selectivity into account. Therefore, credit ratings under the old 
Broad Category & Weight Sub Categories & Weights Factor Criteria 
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Reputation and Pricing Power (5%) Annual change in operating revenue 
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) 
 
Operating Results and Budgetary 
Flexibility (10%) Operating cash flow margin 
Revenue Diversity (15%) Percentage of revenues from its largest revenue stream 
W
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d 
Li
qu
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%
) 
 Total wealth (20%) 
Total cash and investments and 
Spendable Cash & Investments to 
Operating expenses 
Liquidity (5%) Monthly days cash on hand 
Le
ve
r
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e 
(20
% )  Financial Leverage (10%) 
Spendable cash and investments to 
total debt 
Debt affordability (10%) Total debt to cash flow 
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methodology would be more related to say, U.S. News and World Report Rankings, which puts 
primary emphasis on things like selectivity, retention rates, median incoming SAT and ACT 
scores, and other factors related to the quality of education. Moody’s new methodology treats 
higher education issuers more like businesses. Even the one non-financial factor, strategic 
positioning, is related to the issuer’s plans to better the issuer’s financial position in the future 
and the effectiveness of its strategies. 
1.7 S&P Rating Methodology: Not-For-Profit Public and Private Colleges and Universities  
 S&P also established new methodologies for higher education issuers, however, S&P 
publishes distinct methodologies for each type of higher education issuer. This particular 
methodology was effective January 6, 2016. S&P’s rating methodology operates under the same 
basic idea as Moody’s. As opposed to four sections, however, there are two: Enterprise Profile 
and Financial Profile, which are given equal weight. Exhibit 4 describes the Not-For-Profit 
Public and Private College and University rating methodology. 
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Exhibit 4: Not-For-Profit Public and Private College and University rating methodology 
 
Unlike Moody’s Global Higher Education methodology, S&P’s methodology described above 
takes many non-financial factors into account. Factors like matriculation and selectivity that 
Moody’s completely eliminated are still measured by S&P. Additionally, the overarching risk of 
the industry, in this case higher education, is evaluated and the area in which the issuer is located 
is assessed using GDP per capita.  
 Like Moody’s methodology each factor corresponds to a score, which is then weighted 
and results in an indicative score. However, S&P then takes into account “overriding factors and 
caps” into consideration. Financial trends over the last three years are taken into account. If, for 
example, operating revenue is continually growing at a steady rate the issuer may receive a 
“bump” up on its financial profile. S&P also explicitly takes peer analysis into account. Other 
Broad Category & Weight Sub Categories & Weights Factor Criteria  
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%
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Industry Risk (10%) Global higher education rated 2 by S&P 
Economic Fundamentals (10%) GDP per capita 
Market Position and Demand (70%) 
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(full time enrollment) 
Management and Governance (10%) 
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effectiveness, and governance 
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%
) 
 
Financial Management Policies 
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Transparency, reserve and liquidity, 
investment management, long-term 
planning, and debt management 
policies 
Financial Performance (20%) Operating margin, debt service, depreciation, and plant renewal 
Financial Resources (35%) Overall leverage and available resources 
Debt and Contingent Liability Profile 
(35%) 
MADS and available resources to 
total debt 
Debt affordability (10%) Total debt to cash flow 
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adjustments are made for things like strong student to faculty ratios, and a high percentage of 
faculty with PhDs (S&P Global Methodology 2016 p 8) 
1.8 Comparison of Moody’s and S&P’s Rating Methodologies 
 It is reasonable to conclude from a comparison of Exhibit 3 and 4 that S&P takes a more 
holistic approach to its methodology than Moody’s. Moody’s indicative score is based 90% on 
financials, whereas S&P’s indicative score is only 50% financials, and ratings are routinely 
adjusted for many additional factors and trends. This is not to say S&P’s approach is superior to 
Moody’s, just simply that the different structures of the rating methodologies will affect issuers 
credit ratings based on where the issuer’s strengths and weaknesses lie.  
 Since the S&P and Moody’s rating methodologies differ considerably it is important for 
issuers to be aware of the differences and weigh which methodology will likely result in a higher 
rating. Moody’s and S&P project that only 5% and 8%, of issuers respectively will be affected 
by the rating methodology changes (Kedem 2015 p 3) (S&P Global Methodology 2016 p2). It is 
still important, however, for issuers who have only been evaluated by one or the other to 
consider switching agencies, or adding a rating to reap the benefits of the different rating 
approach.  
 However, due to the proximity of the deal being a few months away, and the preexisting 
relationship and familiarity with Moody’s, Union College decided to continue obtaining rating 
only from Moody’s for its next deal. The remainder of the discussion will be in regards to 
Moody’s Global Higher Education rating Methodology. 
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1.9 Introduction to Union College  
 Union College, (Union, or the college) located in Schenectady, NY is the oldest private 
liberal arts college in the U.S. (officially chartered in 1795). The College enrolls roughly 2,200 
students, and is governed by Union’s President, along with its Board of Trustees (Union.edu 
2017). Union College plans to issue new debt for a new money project during the 2016 - 2017 
academic-year. The new money project will finance the building of a new Science and 
Engineering building (herein S&E). The new S&E building aligns with Union’s strategic goals to 
maintain its position as a leading liberal arts school with a strong engineering program. The 
overall cost of the building project will be $100 million. $10 million of the project will be paid 
with funds on hand, and another $40 will be paid for through pledges, and $10 million will serve 
as an endowment for the building. This leaves $50 million of the project cost unpaid. This 
portion of the cost will be paid for by the new debt. Therefore, the college should be aware of 
Moody’s new rating methodology and how it will impact their rating, and thus cost of 
borrowing.  
 Union is currently rated A1, an investment grade rating, as of 2012 (EMMA 2016). 
Moody’s recognizes some of Union’s strengths including, 50% and 30% increases of financial 
resources and cash and investments in FY2014 and FY2015 respectively, Union’s low risk debt 
structure, and Union’s strong engineering program, a differentiating factor from peer institutions 
in the Northeast. Moody’s cites, however, Union’s dependence on student charges for 73% of its 
revenues as its largest challenge (Sharma, Gephardt 2012). Considering Union has not been rated 
since 2012, and the magnitude of this debt issue is substantially larger than any recent deal in the 
past decade, obtaining the best rating possible is a crucial aspect of obtaining the lowest cost of 
capital possible.  
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1.10 Primary Questions 
 The following questions will guide my thesis with the ultimate goal of making two 
primary recommendations to Union: how Union should position its credit story to rating 
agencies, and structures Union should consider when structuring its new debt.  
1. What is Union’s projected rating using Moody’s new rating methodology? 
2. How does Union’s projected rating compare to peer institutions? 
3. How should Union position its strengths and areas of concern to rating agencies? 
4. What considerations should Union make when structuring the debt? 
The above four questions will ultimately lead to recommendations to Union on how to approach 
its credit rating and the structuring of its $50 million of new debt.  
1.11 Data Used for Analysis  
 According to regulatory requirements established by the Electronic Municipal Market 
Access (EMMA), which is under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 
(MSRB), all issuers must enter a Continuing Disclosure Agreement (EMMA 2016). The 
Continuing Disclosure Agreement is found in the official offering statements for any issuer post 
2012 when the regulation was implemented. This agreement requires issuers to post all available 
financial data on EMMA, minimally for the past five fiscal years to the present. Thus, any 
college or university that issues debt must post their annual financial statements publically to 
EMMA’s website.  
 Unfortunately, the financial information is not loaded in a spreadsheet that can easily be 
uploaded for analysis, but rather the financial statements are simply the PDFs of the final 
statements. This makes analyzing multiple schools for peer analysis at one time difficult because 
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each PDF must be meticulously transcribed into excel before the relevant factors from Exhibits 3 
and 4 can be calculated for the scorecards.  
 The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) offers a public online 
database with the financial and relevant nonfinancial data for colleges and universities in the 
United States. Initially, I planned to download all the financial data for every not-for-profit four-
year institution in the Northeast and calculate the relevant financial ratios using “R”, a statistical 
computing program. This would have allowed me to create medians for key indicators. For 
example, if the median change in operating revenue was 5% between FY2014 and FY2015, 
Union’s change in operating revenue, which is above 5%, could be identified as a credit strength 
to the rating agencies.  
 The IPEDS dataset, however, cannot be used for this analysis. Differences in accounting 
from school to school make it impossible. For example, Union College and Bucknell University 
use the same independent auditor, KPMG, to review their annual financials. Even with the same 
company auditing the financials, however, there are considerable differences. For example, the 
second line of Union’s income statement is “Pledges receivable, net.” This is an important line 
item because when calculating ratios pertaining to leverage, like spendable cash and investments 
to total debt, “Pledges receivable, net” must be added back into the numerator according to the 
methodologies of Moody’s and S&P. Bucknell, however, does not report this line item as 
directly as Union. Bucknell lumps “Pledges receivable, net” into a line item called, “Inventories, 
prepaid expenses, and other assets Accounts and other receivables, net.” The necessary line item 
for the calculation is found in an appendix to the financials. The differences in accounting 
between colleges and universities occur frequently. Some schools, like Hamilton College, lump 
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amortization and depreciation together, while most other schools list them separately. Other key 
line items that are reported differently include: 
• Total Debt, which is sometimes listed separately and sometimes lumped together with 
other liabilities 
•  Funds Held in Trust, which is sometimes listed in the balance sheet and other times 
listed in an appendix 
•  Investments, which are sometimes listed as many separate line items that must be added 
together or sometimes as a single item. 
The numerous differences in accounting make it impossible to align a single IPEDS variable to 
the line items for various higher education issuers. To identity which IPEDS variable 
corresponds to issuers’ financials, each issuer’s financials must be separately evaluated and 
manipulated. The problem was further enhanced because IPEDS does not report some key 
variables necessary to calculate the financial ratios for the scorecards. For example, IPEDS does 
not have a variable that measures “Amortization” or “Cash and Cash Equivalents”, two key 
components to many financial ratio calculations. Thus, the IPEDS data was deemed unusable for 
the purpose of conducting peer analysis and creating financial medians.  
 The most viable option for financial data was downloading each issuer’s financial 
statements from EMMA and transcribing the information by hand. I created a comprehensive 
spreadsheet for each institution with its financial data for fiscal years 2014-2016 and the past five 
fiscal years for Union. This information can be found in Appendix A. 
 For other key non-financial metrics I used Common Data Set Initiative reports for Union 
and its peers. All schools that partake in the initiative report information on admissions, 
graduation rates and degrees, retention, and programs. I used this data to analyze strategic 
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positioning trends. The key variables I used from this source were: graduation rate, total 
applications, total admitted, total enrolled, and percentage of students in each program area. This 
raw information is also located in Appendix A.  
1.12 Methodology for Calculating Preliminary Ratings 
 My methodology goal was simple: recreate the scorecards for Moody’s based on its 
rating methodology as closely as possible to simulate the actual preliminary rating scores. The 
rating methodology provides the necessary information to recreate scorecard.  
 As mentioned in section 1.2, Moody’s scorecard measures 10 factors, 9 of which are 
based on the financial statements. Moody’s outlines ranges for scoring that corresponds to each 
factor. Exhibit 5 gives an example of Moody’s ranges.  
Exhibit 5: Ranges for Operating Revenue ($000) According to Moody’s Methodology 
 
For example, if an issuer had operating revenue ($000) equal to $85,000, then the issuer would 
score A for this factor. Therefore, once the financial ratios are calculated it is relatively easy to 
apply the methodology to evaluate how the issuer would score for that given factor.  
This process was simplified by creating an automated scorecard that pulls the calculated 
ratios and evaluates them according to the relevant ranges. For example, Exhibit 6 shows the 
calculation used to evaluate operating revenue.  
 
 
 
Factor Weight Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca 
Operating 
Revenue 
($000) 
15% ≥ 2,700,000 < 2,700,000 ≥ 400,000 
< 400,000 
≥ 75,000 
< 75,000 
≥ 40,000 
< 40,000 
≥ 30,000 
< 30,000 
≥ 20,000 
< 20,000 
≥ 80,000 
< 
8,000 
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Exhibit 6: Sample Calculation Used to Evaluate Operating Revenue 
=IF(C24 >= 2700000, "Aaa", IF( C24 >= 400000, "Aa", IF(C24 >= 75000, "A", IF(C24 >= 
40000, "Baa", IF(C24 >= 30000, "Ba", IF(C24 >= 20000, "B", IF(C24 >= 8000, "Caa", 
IF(C24 < 8000, "Ca")))))))) 
The reference to “C24” is the cell, which pulls the operating revenue ratio. Each alphanumerical 
score corresponds to a numerical value. 
Exhibit 7: Numerical values to Alphanumerical Scores 
 
Following the example from above, if an issuer scored an alphanumerical value of “A” for 
operating revenue, which is the measure for the “Scope of operations category”, the score for this 
factor would be 6. The score in each category is weighted according to the rating methodology. 
For example, In Exhibit 4 operating revenue is given 15% weight.  
 Moody’s measures one nonfinancial factor called strategic positioning. Strategic 
positioning is a qualitative factor that measures reputation and effectiveness of the issuer’s 
governance. Please see Appendix A for the rubric Moody’s uses to assign an alphanumerical 
rating for this factor. This factor involves a judgment call. It is hard to distinguish the difference 
between “strong diversification” and “highly diversified” for example. For this reason, I typically 
looked through rating reports to see how Moody’s referenced a college’s strategic plan or the 
strength of its governance for guidance on this factor. I also used metrics from common data set 
reporting to guide my judgement on assigning scores for the strategic planning criteria. It will 
become apparent later that this factor is a key component to maintain Union’s current A1 rating 
Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca 
1 3 6 9 12 15 18 20 
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and will be discussed in depth in the section discussing Union’s positioning to credit rating 
agencies. 
Exhibit 8: Moody’s Scorecard Outcome  
 
All of the weighted factor scores are added to produce an aggregate weighted factor 
score. The lower the aggregate weighted factor score, the higher the rating. Exhibit 8 displays 
Moody’s final scorecard outcome as they relate to the aggregated weight factor scores. 
Therefore, if a final aggregate weight score for an issuer is 4.8, the issuer should receive a rating 
of A1. As mentioned in Section 1.2, the rating agencies reserve the right to adjust ratings for 
additional credit strengths or weakness that are not listed in the methodology. Differences 
between aggregated weighted factor score and actual rating will be discussed further in the 
discussion of findings.   
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1.13 Union College Findings 
 Based on Union’s FY2016 financial statements and nonfinancial data retrieved from 
Union’s Common Data Set reports, Union’s preliminary score, with the addition of $50 million 
of debt is 4.95. 
 An aggregate score of 4.95, corresponds to a rating of A1, and in fact fall in the middle of 
the A1 range of 4.5 to 5.5. This signifies a maintenance of Union’s most recent and historical 
rating. Exhibit 9 shows Union’s scorecard outcome according to its FY2016 financial statements.  
Exhibit 9: Union’s Moody’s Scorecard According to FY2016 Financial Statements   
 
 
The effect of $50 million of additional debt directly impacts two factors. First, financial leverage, 
measured by spendable cash and investments to total debt, decreases from 2.6 times to 1.8 times 
since debt is in the denominator thus reducing the ratio. Second, debt affordability, measured by 
total debt to cash flow, increases from 3.5 times to 5.0 times because in this ratio debt is in the 
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numerator. The new debt, however, could also indirectly impact strategic positioning. Adding an 
additional $50 million of debt to Union’s existing $116 million outstanding currently may be 
seen as a poor strategic move. Thus, aiming to achieve a, “Very Good” outcome or better in the 
strategic positioning criteria could be crucial to obtaining an A1 credit rating because a lower 
score has the potential to push Union’s aggregate score higher towards an A2 rating. 
 As indicated in Exhibit 9, Union scores A or better in every alphanumerical factor aside 
from revenue diversity. Revenue diversity, however, is a significant outlier with an 
alphanumerical score of Baa. The relevant financial ratio for revenue diversity is measured by 
maximum single contribution, that is the percentage of revenues accounted for by the largest 
stream of revenues. Union relies heavily on student tuition and fees for revenue. Roughly 70% of 
revenues come from student tuition and fees. To a rating agency this poses a problem because if 
there is some sort of event that deters students from attending the college, the majority of 
revenues used to repay investors is gone.  
 Union’s strongest categories are: reputation and pricing power, operating results, 
operating reserve, and liquidity. Union’s Aaa factor score for reputation and pricing power is 
because of Union’s high annual change in operating revenue. Union’s operating revenues 
steadily rose in the past five fiscal years. Operating revenues grew around almost 8% between 
FY2013 and FY2014, almost 11% between FY2014 and FY2015, nearly 16% between FY2015 
and FY2016. The positive change in revenue was driven by rises in three main revenue streams: 
tuition and fees, room and board, and private gifts and grants. The most significant growth was 
in the private gifts and grants category with 236% growth since FY2011. The drastic growth in 
private gifts and grants can be largely attributed to a giving campaign led by the current 
president, President Stephen Ainlay. The operating results category was also strong. Operating 
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results is measured by operating cash flow margin, commonly used to measure effectiveness of 
financial management. An operating cash flow margin of nearly 27% suggests that Union’s 
management policies and financial plans align with revenue and expenditure growth goals. 
 Union’s operating reserve and liquidity metrics are also strong. Operating reserve, as 
measured by spendable cash to operating expenses is 3.6 times. This shows Union can operate 
without additional wealth. Liquidity, as measured by days cash on hand, is strong at 594 days. 
Union’s liquidity is consistently strong and cited as a strength by Moody’s (Sharma, Gephardt 
2012). 
 Although Union’s preliminary weighted scorecard outcome returns a score of 4.95 and a 
preliminary rating of A1, this is not to say Union will undoubtedly maintain its prior rating. 
Moody’s states that almost all final ratings are within one or two notches of the preliminary 
scorecard ratings (Kedem 2015 pg. 15). If a debt issue is a negotiated deal, as this deal is, it is not 
uncommon for the lead banking team on the deal to put together a rating agency presentation for 
the relevant rating agencies. One tactic used by underwriters is to compare the college to peer 
institutions to highlight the relevant issuer’s strengths and discuss how weaknesses are being 
addressed in order to obtain a higher rating. Therefore, Union’s presentation of its credit story to 
Moody’s is of critical importance to maintain an A1 rating. Thus, it seems appropriate to 
compare Union to peer institutions to enhance its credit story.  
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Chapter 2: Peer Analysis 
2.1 Identifying a Peer Group 
The first step in conducting peer analysis is choosing a peer group. In choosing a peer group I 
considered the following factors: 
• Location: in the Northeast  
• Type of School: Not-For-Profit Private 4-year Institution, Co-Ed 
• Size: Enrolls fewer than 5,000 students 
• Reputation: Ranking above 40 on U.S. News and World Report 
Location is important because the economic landscape changes considerably across the country. 
The Northeast is generally wealthier than the southern regions or middle regions of the country 
and therefore would not provide a good comparison. The type of school is important because 
Moody’s identifies specific methodologies for each different type of higher education institutions 
(i.e. Universities vs. Colleges). Therefore, to compare Union’s estimated Moody’s score to other 
schools, they must be not-for-profit private 4-year institutions. Size is important for similar 
reasons. Size is also highly linked to revenue and other financial indicators, considering most 
schools rely heavily on tuition and fees for revenue. Finally, reputation is important because if 
schools are of a similar reputation they will be considered closer substitutes in the college 
market. This means they will have a similar demand base, which affects selectivity, retention, 
matriculation, and other demand related factors. 
 Given the above criteria I identified, Bates College, Hamilton College, Colby College, 
Franklin and Marshall College (F&M), and Bucknell University as peer institutions for Union 
College. Exhibit 10 gives a brief comparison of Union to the five peer institutions.  
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Exhibit 10: Selection of Peers 
 
Based on these nonfinancial criteria, Bates and F&M are arguably Union’s closest peers. 
2.2 Union Compared to Peers with Moody’s Methodology  
 Exhibit 11 summarizes the findings for peer institutions compared to Union. Using 
FY2016 financial statements, the most recent available, and applying the same scorecard 
methodology as before, Exhibit 11 shows the preliminary outcomes for Union’s peer group. 
Exhibit 11: Peer School Analysis According to Moody’s Scorecard  
  
School Enrollment Location U.S. New & World Report Ranking 
Private not-for-
profit 4-yr 
institution 
Union 2,269 Schenectady, NY 38 yes 
Bates 1,792 Lewiston, ME 27 yes 
Hamilton 1,872 Clinton, NY 13 yes 
Colby 1,857 Waterville, ME 12 yes 
F&M 2,249 Lancaster, PA 47 yes 
Bucknell 3,569 Lewisburg, PA 32 yes 
 26 
Interestingly, both Hamilton and Bucknell, currently rated Aa2 come out with preliminary 
overall scores in the A1 category, with scores of 5.0 and 5.1 respectively. This is two-notches 
below their current ratings. Colby, also rated Aa2 currently, scored an aggregate of 4.5 putting it 
in the Aa3 category, one-notch below its current rating. Bates’ overall score of 7.3 was the worst 
in the group, putting it one-notch below its current A1 rating with a preliminary rating of A3. 
F&M also came out with a preliminary rating of A1, consistent with its current rating.  
2.3 Potential Explanations for Inconsistencies 
 After looking at the Moody’s scorecard analysis for Union and its peer group the 
following question emerged. Are Union, Bates, and F&M rated lower than they should be? Or 
are Hamilton, Colby, and Bucknell rated more highly than they should be? The current ratings 
were calculated using Moody’s old higher education rated methodology. As mentioned before, 
Moody’s prior rating methodology relied more heavily on aspects related to student demand, 
things like retention and matriculation (which have since been eliminated). These are also things 
that U.S. News and World Report use for their rankings. I looked up the top ten liberal arts 
schools according to U.S. News and World Report and found their Moody’s ratings. All of these 
schools were in the highest investment grade category, Aaa. My suspicion is that Moody’s 
adjusted Colby and Bates, ranked 12 and 13 respectively, for their strong reputation and strong 
demand. This would explain why for example, their poor revenue diversity it overlooked, 
because when the school is in high demand it does not matter as much that revenues are not 
diverse.  
 The most surprising outcome in the peer group were that Hamilton and Bucknell arrived 
at preliminary scores equivalent to two-notches below their current ratings. Both colleges scored 
poorly in the reputation and pricing power and revenue diversity factors. Since reputation and 
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pricing power is measured by annual change in operating revenue this could simply reflect that 
Bucknell and Hamilton experienced little growth in operating revenue, however, if their 
operating revenues were already substantial enough to cover operating expenses easily this is not 
a major concern. This is one instance where Moody’s would likely look at annual trends and 
make adjustments as they see fit to more accurately represent Hamilton and Bucknell’s financial 
position.   
 Other factors may be adjusted or weighted more that Hamilton and Bucknell score well 
in.  As Moody’s states in their methodology they, “in some circumstances, the importance of one 
factor may exceed its prescribed weight in this methodology” (Kedem pg. 5). Potential factors 
that could be weighted more heavily include strategic positioning, liquidity, and financial 
leverage. 
 Additionally, it should be kept in mind that Moody’s states almost all preliminary 
outcomes are within two-notches of the final rating. Thus, since all of these preliminary scores 
are within two-notches it is reasonable to conclude that these preliminary outcomes could be 
very similar to what Moody’s analysts calculate. 
2.4 Union’s Strengths Relative to Peer Institutions 
 Before delving into Union’s strengths compared to peer colleges, it is useful to visualize 
how close Union is its peer currently rated Aa2: Bucknell, Colby, and Hamilton. Exhibit 12 
shows the ten factors from Moody’s scorecard on each of the axes. The more robust a circle, the 
better the college scored overall. As explained previously, a score of 1 in any factor is the best 
possible score and a score of 20 is the worst.  
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Exhibit 12: Union (A1) V. Peers Currently Rated (Aa2) 
 
 In Exhibit 12 we see that the maroon line representing Union’s score overlaps with the 
other lines a considerable amount, and at some points Union’s line lies on the outside of the other 
schools showing that Union outperforms in some categories. Although this graph does not take 
the weights of each factor into account, it still shows the closeness of the preliminary scores.  
 Union is on par with or outperforms more highly rated peer institutions in five factors: 
scope of operations, reputation and pricing power, operating results, operating reserve, and debt 
affordability. Scope of operations, measured by operating revenue is scored as the same 
alphanumerical outcome for all the colleges, A. The A score for this factor ranges from operating 
revenues between $75,000,000 and $400,000,000. Since the range is so large all the colleges are 
securely in this category because of their similar tuition base and student body size. Reputation 
1
6
11
16
Scope	of	operations
Reputation	and	Pricing	
Power
Strategic	Positioning
Operating	Results
Revenue	diversity
Total	wealth
Operating	Reserve
liquidity
Financial	Leverage
Debt	afforability
Union	(A1)	V.	Peers	Currently	Rated	(Aa2)
Hamilton:	Currently	(Aa2) Bucknell:	Currently	(Aa2)
Colby:	Currently	(Aa2) Union:	Currently	(A1)
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and pricing power, measured by annual change in operating revenue is one of Union’s strongest 
categories as discussed previously. The high change in operating revenue due to increases in 
private gifts makes Union stand out compared to peers that experienced little growth in revenues. 
 Operating results, measured by operating cash flow margin, demonstrates Union’s ability 
to meet budgetary needs. Union’s score of 26.8% far exceeds the next highest ratio of 15.8%. 
Union’s ratio is so strong because of Union’s strong operating income. Peer colleges have low, 
or even negative operating income, which means endowment spending or other funds must be 
used to cover the imbalance. Union, however, covers its annual expenses more easily in 
comparison to peers. Additionally, Union’s operating reserve factor, measured by spendable cash 
and investments to operating income is also strong. This factors helps show whether an 
institution can handle times of financial stress. Finally, Union’s debt affordability, even with the 
addition of $50 million of additional debt is still good at 5.0 times. This is largely driven by the 
fact that peer institutions like Hamilton and Colby have taken on far more debt than Union; 
Union currently has $116 million outstanding, while Hamilton and Colby have more than $220 
million. This comparison supports that Union is considered a more cautious borrower than other 
colleges. Thus, Union’s strengths relative to its peers is driven by their strong and increasing 
operating revenue and relatively low debt outstanding. 
2.5 Union’s Areas of Weakness Relative to Peers 
 Peer colleges rated more highly outperform relative to Union in four factors: liquidity, 
financial leverage, total wealth, and potentially strategic positioning. As mentioned previously, 
Union’s liquidity is strong at 594 days, putting it in the Aa alphanumerical range for this factor. 
Peers, however, have even better liquidity than Union, but this is not a concern. 
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 Financial leverage, measured by spendable cash and investments to total debt, and total 
wealth, measured by total cash and investments, are clearly tied to one another, both take into 
account cash and investments. This is where Union’s smaller endowment is reflected in the 
scorecard. Union’s endowment, which was valued at $432 million in FY16 is about half the size 
of Hamilton, Bucknell, and Colby’s endowments at $883 million, $817 million, and $925 million 
respectively. The magnitude of Union’s endowment in relation to peer colleges is Union’s 
biggest concern financially. There is an industry expectation that colleges will only draw on the 
endowment incrementally year over year. Thus, if there was a problem with Union’s finances 
and they had to use the endowment to cover its debt service, much of the endowment would be 
depleted. This raises concerns for rating agencies. This concern is exacerbated because Union’s 
endowment return was about -9.0% and cited by Bloomberg as the worst endowment return 
among the “little Ivies” (McDonald, Smith 2016).  
2.6 Recommendations for Union’s Credit Story and Positioning Union’s Weaknesses 
 Union faces two main issues in terms of its credit rating: explaining its weakest factor, 
revenue diversity and justifying a score of “very good” for strategic positioning. Union can draw 
on peer comparison to strengthen its credit story and point to Moody’s methodology for support.  
 For example, Moody’s states, “Within a broad revenue category, there may be significant 
diversity that helps mitigate risks. Examples include programmatic and geographic diversity of 
the student body for tuition charges” (Kedem 2015 p 9). Although Union’s preliminary 
alphanumerical score for revenue diversity is Baa because roughly 70% of revenues are secured 
through one revenue stream, student tuition and fees, this revenue stream is diverse in itself. 
Using this logic from Moody’s own methodology, Union can argue the “broad revenue category” 
of student tuition and fees should be reevaluated because of Union’s strong programmatic and 
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geographic diversity. This is also a good opportunity to discuss Union’s strong engineering 
program, which sets Union apart from peer institutions and will be significantly strengthened by 
the S&E project.  
 Programmatic and geographic diversity at Union is strong. According to Union’s most 
recent common data set reporting 68% of students come are out-of-state and 11% of students are 
international. This helps protect Union’s revenues if there was decreased demand say in the 
northeast or even the U.S., Union could draw on its interest across the country and abroad to 
maintain its revenues.  
 Coupled with Union’s strong geographic diversity is robust programmatic diversity. 
Union offers more than 40 majors to students with the option to combine majors in an 
interdepartmental major (union.edu 2017). According to the most current common data set 
report, 13% of students graduated with degrees in engineering. Union offers four different 
engineering majors, one of the primary distinctions between Union and peer colleges. Of the five 
peers identified, only Bucknell had an engineering program. This shows not only that Union sets 
itself apart programmatically compared to peers, but also explains the need to invest in the 
building of the new S&E project.  
 Union’s largest program of study is social sciences with 30% of the total degrees 
conferred. However, it should be noted that the weight of this category is overstated because 
social sciences encompass multiple majors and areas of study. Therefore, Union is able to attract 
students interested in a variety of programs, which further protects its student tuition and fees 
revenue stream. Union should aim to highlight the unique combination it offers as a liberal arts 
school with a strong engineering program. This is the essence of Union’s mission to encourage a 
breadth of education. Exhibit 13 summarizes Union’s programmatic and geographic diversity. 
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Exhibit 13: Union’s Programmatic and Geographic Diversity  
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, despite a score of Baa in this factor category, it is still the best among its peers (see 
Exhibit 9). Thus, this is a category that typically every college struggles with considering the 
other means of generating revenue are so incremental.  
 Through successful strategic planning, however, Union improved in this category over 
the years. Union decreased student tuition and fees as a percentage of total revenue from roughly 
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82% in FY13 to 70% in FY16. This decrease is largely attributed to increasing private gifts and 
grants since FY11. Exhibit 11 shows the growth of private gifts and grants from FY11 to FY16 
in thousands of dollars.  
Exhibit 11: Union’s Private Gifts and Grants FY11 to FY16 ($000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Union’s private gifts and grants increased 236% since FY11, and private gifts and grants as a 
percentage of total revenue increased from 9% to 22% over the same period. This is a direct 
result of Union’s ability to identify revenue diversification as an area of concern and target the 
problem systematically by increasing growth in a different revenue stream. President Ainlay led 
a strategic plan to increase gifts through grass root campaigns like, “A day 4 U”, social media 
challenges, and new approaches to “generation U” giving (alumni of the past decade) (union.edu 
2017). The success of these campaigns affirm that the growth will be sustained in the future and 
do not show just a one-time increase in private gifts and grants. Moody’s specifically states, 
“Integral to determining strategic priorities is a university’s ability to identify strengths and 
weakness relative to key competitors and to track progress against established goals (Kedem 
2015 p 7).  Thus, explaining Union’s plan to target its revenue diversity weakness, and its 
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success in doing so could also contribute to its goal of achieving an outcome of, “very good” for 
strategic planning. 
 Union should also be prepared to discuss its strategic plan more broadly. Specifically, 
Union should be prepared to discuss its negative endowment return and the plans to generate 
positive returns in the future. For example, although the year over year endowment return is 
negative, looking at different time horizons may show less drastic negative returns (Blake 2017). 
Union can also explain how aiming to increase private gifts are grants is helping to slowly 
increase Union’s endowment base, thus growing its potential. After discussing with Union’s 
Vice President of Finance, Diane Blake, she expressed that the board did indeed have plans to 
change the way they choose to invest the endowment. Currently, members of the board make 
endowment decisions, but that may no longer be the case in the future. Union should overview 
these plans with the Moody’s to assure the rating agency that Union is capable of handling the 
situation.  
  I recommend also discussing positive aspects and trends in terms of applications, 
retention rates, and graduation rates to show that Union is attracting many future students and 
when students come to Union they generally have a good experience.  Since academic year 
2011-2012 Union largely maintained its selectivity and matriculation percentages. Currently 
Union’s selectivity according to the most recent common data reporting is at 38%, while 
matriculation is at 25%. Union’s graduation rates are also high over the same time period ranging 
from 86% to 93%. Union’s retention rates are on par with its peers. Exhibit 14 shows retention 
rates for Union, Bates, F&M, Bucknell, and Hamilton from academic years 2011-2012 to 2015-
2016.  
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Exhibit 14: Retention Rates Academic Years 2011-2012 to 2015-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although Union’s retention rates fell about four percentage points from 2012-2013 to 2014-
2015, retention rates as of 2015-2016 converged with peers at around 93%. This is one indication 
that Union students are largely satisfied with their decision to attend the college. Additionally, 
Union’s overall increase in applications since academic year 2011-2012 was 16.4%. Over the 
same period Bates and Hamilton saw 8.8% and -0.66 percent growth respectively. F&M and 
Bucknell’s applications increased more than Union’s over the same period, with 39.9% and 
26.5% increases respectively. However, Union’s increase of 16.4% is still impressive, 
demonstrating an increased demand to attend Union. 
 In addition to mitigating Union’s two weakest points, Union should use its strengths 
relative to its peer group to strengthen its credit. Strengths, discussed in section 2.4, should be 
highlighted to Moody’s and tied into its overall credit story. The peer comparison helps put 
Union’s increasing revenues, Union’s cautious borrowing, and ability to combat times of 
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financial stress into perspective. These strengths help reinforce Union’s main points that it is a 
fiscally responsible institution and that the S&E building project is a well thought out endeavor.  
 After this portion of the presentation, I recommend tying the discussion together, talking 
about how S&E building project fits in with this overall plan. I recommend discussing how the 
building project positively affects Union’s competitive advantage in engineering with liberal arts, 
how the S&E building could inadvertently contribute to increased applications and better 
matriculation, and how updating this building will draw more support from alumni who have 
expressed that the building needs to be updated will better Union’s credit. This explanation of 
Union’s strategic position and its overall vision for the S&E building will hopefully help Union 
secure a score of “very good” or better for strategic positioning, and an overall rating of A1.  
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Chapter 3: Union College Debt Structure Considerations 
 
3.1 Identifying a Framework for Debt Structuring  
  
 There are many things to consider and many decisions to make when issuing debt. First, 
issuers must take preexisting debt into account. For example, let’s imagine a college, let’s call it 
Blue College, that has the following debt to be paid over the upcoming years. Exhibit 15 shows 
how much debt must be repaid over the next ten years for the fictional Blue College.  
Exhibit 15: Blue College’s Current Debt Service 
  
In total, Blue College currently has $70 million of debt outstanding. If they decided to build a 
new dorm and need to issue an additional $30 million of new money debt they have a few 
options. Blue College could level its debt service payments and issue $5 million of debt in years 
5 to 10. Let’s call this option 1. Alternatively, Blue College could issue a mixture of short-term 
(debt in years 1-5) and some long-term debt. We will call this option 2. Or, Blue College could 
Year 1 $10 Million 
Year 2 $10 Million 
Year 3 $10 Million 
Year 4 $10 Million 
Year 5 $5 Million 
Year 6 $5 Million 
Year 7 $5 Million 
Year 8 $5 Million 
Year 9 $5 Million 
Year 10 $5 Million 
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push the debt out further, extending the time horizon of the debt structure, issuing $5 million in 
years 11-16. We will call this option 3. There are pros and costs to each option.  
 Option 1, or leveling the debt so that $10 million must be paid each year, is the most 
sustainable from a financial perspective, meaning the debt service is roughly the same year after 
year. Sustainability of debt service is an advantage because it is predictable and arguably easier 
to budget for (Denison, Fowles, Moody 2014). This structure, however, concentrates the debt to 
be repaid unnecessarily over only a ten-year period. The concentration of debt is the main 
drawback to option 1.  
 Option 2, or mixing short-term and long-term debt, is the most balanced. Since different 
types of investors (separately managed accounts, insurance agencies, individuals, hedge funds 
etc.) look to diversify their portfolios and are attracted to different aspects of a bond, it is 
important to spread debt across the curve to ensure there will be investor demand to buy the debt 
(Guibaud, Nosbush, Vayanos 2013).  
 Option 3, or extending the debt, will help maintain the current debt structure, and simply 
push the debt service out further into the future. This is a positive on the one hand because Blue 
College likely already budgeted for the current debt structure, and thus this budgeting will not be 
disturbed. On the other hand, extending all the debt to long-term debt means higher interest rate 
cost and more interest rate payments increases risk because the longer-term debt is perceived as 
more-risky. Furthermore, this is also taking a bet that long-term interest rates will not go any 
lower than they are at the time of the bond sale (Kancuzk, Alfaro 2009). Market conditions must 
be evaluated to predict trends on interest rates. 
 Although these three scenarios are fictitious, they demonstrate an important conceptual 
framework that applies to Union’s actual debt issue. From the three scenarios, we learn that there 
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are a few things to keep in mind when structuring the new debt: sustainability of the debt service 
given financial constraints, an absence of concentration of the debt in any year or group of years, 
balance between short-term and long-term debt, and market conditions. In addition to these four 
main considerations, there are other aspects of the type of bonds to issue: variable rate or fixed 
rate, callable or non-callable, and series or term bond1. Since rating agencies typically view 
variable rate debt as more-risky, and Union’s finance team has expressed that they wish to only 
offer fixed rate debt (Blake 2017). Thus, the structures will all assume fixed rate.  
3.2 Union’s Current Debt Service 
 Union currently has debt from four series of bonds outstanding: Series 1999, Series 2006, 
Series 2008, and Series 2012. Exhibit 16 shows how much principal will be due in each year out 
to 2037, the last year Union currently has principal due. Each color represents a different series 
of bonds. We can see that there are considerable spikes in the years 2029, 2031, 2032, and 2037. 
These spikes are term bonds. All of the term bonds Union issued except for the 2037 term bond 
from series 2009, however, are subject to mandatory sinking fund redemption. Mandatory 
sinking fund redemption requires the issuer to regularly redeem a fixed portion of some or all of 
the bonds according to a fixed schedule. Therefore, although these spikes caused by the term 
bonds appear to be a looming issue they are not in reality. For example, according to page 10 of 
Union’s Series 2006 official statement the 2031 term bond is subject to its first mandatory 
sinking fund payment of $2.5 million on July 1st, 2027 (EMMA 2017). There are three more 
mandatory sinking fund payments in 2028, 2029, and 2030 of similar slightly varying sizes.  
Exhibit 16 shows Union’s debt service as issued without the mandatory sinking fund schedule. 
                                                
1 A series bond is a classic bond that pays interest payments (usually semiannually) until the 
principal is due. A term bond is structured so that all of the interest and principal comes due at 
maturity. 
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Exhibit 17 shows Union’s debt service taking the mandatory sinking fund schedules of the bonds 
into account. 
 
Exhibit 16: Union’s Current Debt Service in $000  
 
 
Exhibit 17: Union’s Current Debt Service in $000 taking the Mandatory Sinking Fund 
Schedule into Account 
02000
40006000
800010000
1200014000
Current	Debt	Service	$000
Series	1999 Series	2006 Series	2008 Series	2012
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Since the sinking fund payments are mandatory, the relevant debt service structure is not the 
structure that was issued displayed in Exhibit 1, but rather the structure shown in Exhibit 17. The 
goal now is to find a logical way to add an additional $50 million of debt on top of and around 
the existing maturities shown in Exhibit 17. As in the example with Blue College, there will be 
pros and cons to each debt structure scenario. Union should consider the balance between long-
term and short-term debt, deft affordability in terms of sustainability of debt, and a lack of 
concentration of the debt and current market conditions.  
 After discussing with Union’s finance department, they expressed that $10 million of 
short term-debt is the maximum amount they could issue. Additionally, Union’s underwriter 
advised that there would not be demand for short-term debt in excess of $10 million (Kabalian 
2017). Thus, the decision to place ten million of short-term debt in potential structures was not 
entirely arbitrary, but rather a reflection of prior analysis. Issuing $10 million of short-term debt 
also aligns with Union’s pledge payment schedule. Union could effectively offset all of the 
short-term principal payments with pledges. Union’s finance department also made it clear that 
all the debt would be tax-exempt and all the debt would be fixed rate (Blake, Kabalian 2017). 
Thus, it should be assumed that any potential debt structures are assumed fixed rate debt issued 
in denominations of at least $5,000 (the bare minimum for a maturity).  
3.3 Potential Debt Structures for Union’s $50 Million of Additional Debt 
 I propose three distinct debt structures for Union’s additional $50 million of new money 
debt. In order to maximize the long-term to short-term debt balance the maximum $10 million of 
short-term debt is structured into all three scenarios (Kabalian 2017). The first option is the level 
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debt structure option, the second option is the “staircase” structure option, and the third option is 
the term bond option. Exhibits 18, 19, and 20 below display these three options in that order.  
 
 
Exhibit 18: Option 1, Level Debt Service 
 
 
Exhibit 19: Option 2, “Staircase” Debt Service 
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Exhibit 20: Option 3, Term Bond 
 
 
Options one, two, and three are exactly the same from maturities 2017 through 2029. 
Therefore, they all issue the maximum $10 million of short-term debt. The differences in the 
debt structuring options come after the year 2029. In the first option, the level option, all the 
principal maturities are structured to be about the same as height as the principal due in 2029. In 
the second option, the “staircase” option, the debt increases gradually after 2029 with $28.8 
million of new debt issue between 2029 and 2037. Finally, in the term bond option, there is only 
$13.1 million of new debt issued between 2029 and 2037 and a term bond issued thirty years out 
to 2047. Each option has distinct pros and cons.  
 At a glance, option one, the level option, may seem like the best option in terms of 
avoiding debt concentration. All of the debt is paid off by 2038, and roughly the same amount of 
principal is due each year. If we look back to the original debt structure, however, we can see in 
Exhibit 17 that the current debt service has a staircase like pattern. This is because although the 
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debt service looks like its increasing, when interest payments are taken into account the debt 
service is actually more level. In the foremost years Union must pay interest on all the 
outstanding bonds as well as the principal amount due in any given year. Thus, as the years go on 
the principal should increase, because the number of interest payments are decreasing. Option 
one would only be level in the extreme and impossible case of zero percent interest rates on all 
the maturities of the new debt. This is why the second option, the “staircase” option is better than 
the first in terms of avoiding a concentration of debt. Although the principle due is increasing in 
option two, the debt service (principle due and interest) will actually be more level. How level 
the debt service actually is depends on the achieved interest rate and yields during pricing. The 
higher the interest rates, the higher the interest rate payments will be, and the more dramatic the 
staircase structure must be to accommodate the payments to make the debt service more level. 
More level debt payments are easier to plan for from a budgetary perspective, and are therefore 
more fiscally sustainable because roughly the same amount will be set aside year after year.  
 However, Union should assess whether debt structure option two achieves the best 
sustainability because of how high the average principal payments are. Structure two adds a 
heavy debt burden for the next twenty years with $28.8 million in principal due between 2029 
and 2037. The average amount of principal due over the next twenty years would be $5.8 million 
annually. Option two, however, could be relatively expensive since over $20 million of the debt 
is longer term. Classically, longer maturities result in higher interest rate costs and higher yields. 
In the next section, section 3.4, two recent college debt issues will be discussed as well as current 
interest rate considerations help get a sense for how expensive longer term debt will be. 
 Option three combines the “staircase” idea from option two and removes the heavy debt 
burden from 2029 to 2037 by issuing a long-term term bond due in 2047. As opposed to issuing 
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$28.8 million between years 2029 and 2037 as option two does, option three only issues $13.3 
million over this same period. In Exhibit 20 we can see that option three makes use of a staircase 
structure leading up to 2029, and then there is an additional lower staircase from 2029 to 2037.  
Lowering the debt service in these mid-years and still maintaining the staircase structure up to 
2029 offers the distinct advantage of increasing flexibility for future issues. For example, if 
Union chooses to issue more debt say five or ten years from now, Union still has the ability to 
add additional principal to years 2030 on without disrupting Union’s budgetary confinements. 
Lowering the principal between these years also lowers average principal payments from $5.8 
million a year over the next twenty years in option two, to a more manageable $3.8 million a 
year over thirty years. By extending the farthest maturity to the maximum maturity of thirty 
years, the debt service from a principal standpoint becomes more manageable. Additionally, by 
issuing, a term bond in 2047 Union does not have to account for interest payments on $15.6 
million of long-term debt until the term bond or sinking fund payments come due. Conversely, 
since term bonds are an additional risk for investors, the interest rate on the bond could be 
higher. 
 I recommend making the 2047 term bond subject to mandatory sinking fund payments. 
Union used this tactic in the past to mitigate the spike in principal due in any year, thus avoiding 
a concentration of debt. Sinking fund payments reassure Union the term bond is not a budgetary 
issue in the future, but the college can steal reap the benefits of not paying the interest on the 
term bond now.  
 There are infinite ways to structure Union’s additional debt. While these three options 
only represent three structuring scenarios, I think option three, or a structure that uses the same 
principal ideas, is the best option given Union’s current debt structure for the following reasons:   
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1. Although there could be a higher interest rate on the 2047 term bond, it will lessen the 
average debt service over the next 30 years by roughly $2 million in principal annually 
and have additional benefits in terms of lessened interest payments upfront. 
2. Breaking the term bond into mandatory sinking fund payments will mitigate the 
concern of the 2047 principal spike. 
3. Option three still issues the maximum amount of short-term debt, which assures that 
Union will take advantage of the lower interest rates on the short end of the yield curve 
and can offset these principal payments with pledges. 
4.  Option three lowers the debt service between the years 2029 and 2037 by roughly 
$15.5 million giving Union increased flexibility for future issues.  
 Therefore, option three achieves the best balance possible between short-term and long-
term debt, lowers the concentration of debt by issuing less principal in the mid-term years, makes 
the debt service more sustainable by lowering the average amount of principal due over the next 
thirty years, and lowers upcoming interest payments by issuing a large long-term term bond.  
3.4 Recent College Debt Issues and Interest Rate Considerations 
According to EMMA there were two recent debt issues for higher education issuers. The 
most recent deal was for Iowa State University of Science and Technology. The deal was 
complicated. It was issued in three separate parts with individual official statements; two 
separate refundings, and a new money issue, all of which priced on March 1st. In total the deal 
was a similar size to what Union will issue with a total between the three issues of $55.4 million. 
However, each part of the deal had different debt ratings by different agencies and somewhat 
bizarre interest rate schemes. The first deal matured between 2018 and 2042 but all the interest 
rates were between 3.0% and 3.5%. The second deal matured from 2018 to 2028 and all the 
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interest rates were 4.0% even. The final portion matured between 2017 and 2034 and all the 
interest rates were 5.0%. A deal this complex seems atypical and the interest rates are abnormal. 
Aside from the size of the deal, the Iowa University issue has little in common with Union’s 
future issue.  
Haverford College, however, also issued new debt recently. Haverford College is a top 
rated private liberal arts college just outside of Philadelphia. On February 28th Haverford issued 
$98.3 million of debt rated AA- by Fitch and S&P. These ratings are considered the equivalent of 
Aa3 rating by Moody’s standards, one notch above where Union will tentatively will be rated. 
Although Haverford’s deal was large, about $40 million of the deal was new money while the 
rest was a refunding of prior debt. Thus, although this deal in sum is about twice the size of 
Union’s, the new money portion of the deal is roughly similar to Union’s. Additionally, since 
Haverford is also a small liberal arts college in the Northeast and the credit is rated similarly to 
Union, the deal could offer useful insight.  Exhibit 21 below shows the maturities, coupons, and 
yields for Haverford’s Series 2017A issue.  
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Exhibit 21: Haverford’s Series 2017A Deal 
Haverford issued serial maturities from 2017 to 2037 and three term bonds, one in 2042 and two 
in 2046. Haverford issued only $5.2 million of short-term debt and three large long-term term 
bonds, which in total accounted for roughly half the debt issue. We can see that the amount 
issued increases as the maturities go further out into longer-term debt, showing the staircase idea 
implemented. 
 The asterisks next to the yields indicate that a bond is callable. Therefore the maturities 
from 2027 to 2037 are callable, as are the 2042 and one of the 2046 term bonds. However, there 
are two 2037 maturities and one is not callable.  The term 2042 term bond and the 2037 serial 
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bond that are not callable have lower interest rates than the callable bonds because the investors 
do not need to be compensated for the possibility the bond could be called prior to maturity. 
Overall, the interest rates are relatively straightforward. 2017 has an interest rate of 3.0%, 2018 
with 4.0%, and almost all the other maturities have interest rates of 5.0%. (The 2036 maturity 
with a lower interest rate was likely created specifically to meet an investor’s demand that 
wanted a higher yield as opposed to more interest.) While in theory we would expect to see the 
interest rates gradually increase as the bonds become longer-term, this theory does not always 
hold in practice. Although interest rates do not increase as we would expect, the yields do follow 
a classic pattern: as the maturities become longer the yields are generally higher. 
 Long-term interest rates have reached all-time historical lows in the past twelve months 
and the yield curve has become increasingly flattened. This is why in the Haverford deal, and 
generally, interest rates are relatively similar across the curve. Exhibit 22 shows U.S. Treasuries 
for 1-yr, 10-yr, and 30-yr maturities since 2000 (FRED 2017).  
 
Exhibit 22: 1-Yr, 10-Yr, and 30-Yr U.S. Treasuries Since 2000 
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From Exhibit 22 it is apparent that interest rates have fallen considerably since 2000 when all of 
the rates were between 6% and 7%. Since the great recession in 2008, interest rates have 
converged and stayed low, primarily attributed to actions taken by the Federal Reserve. 
Currently, we can see that short-term interest rates have ticked up slightly and are no longer near 
zero, but are still below 1%, and long-term interest rates are still historically low. Exhibit 22 
supports why Haverford structured about 50% of their debt as long-term term bonds and pushed 
a large majority of the debt into the mid and long-term years. We can see in Exhibit 21 that 
Haverford will pay the same interest rate on a 30-year term bond as they will on a three-year 
serial bond, thus it made sense for Haverford to issue a majority of the debt long-term since there 
was no additional cost from an interest rate standpoint. Issuing large term bonds will also help 
Haverford keep their debt payments in the forefront years lower.  
 I feel Haverford’s Series 2017A deal further supports that Union should consider 
structuring their debt based on option 3. Haverford’s deal shows how issuing large long-term 
term bonds accomplishes lower up-front costs and could potentially impact interest rate costs 
minimally because of current market conditions.  
3.5 Summary of the Project and How S&E fits in with Union’s Strategic Plan 
 Union states in its strategic plan that its primary goal is to, “Further Union's mission as a 
scholarly community that educates students to be engaged, innovative and ethical contributors to 
an increasingly diverse, global and technologically complex society” (Union.edu 2017) The 
building of the new Science and Engineering building is well aligned with this vision. President 
Ainlay called the project, “the largest, most expensive, most complex project in Union’s history” 
(Ainlay 2017). However, this capital project is not just an expensive undertaking, but rather an 
expansion of Union’s reach to future students and a manifestation of its mission. This year Union 
was named one of the top five schools for women in STEM by U.S.A Today College Guide 
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(Bouluc 2017). The building will be a combined renovation and rebuild resulting in the 
reinvigoration of the STEM areas. New science facilities will not only help Union maintain this 
position, but potentially help Union meet other strategic goals like attracting more women to the 
school who want to study STEM programs. The S&E building is a wise capital investment 
because it will continue Union’s standing as a top Engineering liberal arts college and help 
attract a diverse student body interested in the latest advancements in science and technology.  
 Union is well positioned to secure an A1 rating for the debt under Moody’s new Global 
Higher Education Rating methodology. After reviewing Union’s most recent and past financials, 
Union has the ability to take on more debt while still maintaining good leverage and debt 
affordability ratios. By comparing the college to peer institutions Union will be able to enhance 
their strongest criteria, while defending their weakest metric, revenue diversity. A discussion of 
how this project will reinvigorate Union’s STEM areas of study and help better its competitive 
edge in the field of engineering will speak to Union’s strong strategic positioning.  
 Assuming Union will achieve an investment grade rating from Moody’s, there are many 
options in terms of structuring the additional debt. Based on the historically low interest rates and 
the pricing of the recent Haverford deal, Union should capitalize on the market conditions by 
issuing a large long-term term bond to lower upfront costs. By issuing $10 million of short-term 
debt Union will be able to pay off a fifth of the principal within five years through pledged 
donations for the project.  
 President Ainlay ended his public announcement of the project stating, “Union will be the 
college of choice for physicists who want to dance, or chemists who want to double major in art” 
(Ainlay 2017). This capital project has the ability to further Union’s legacy and help Union 
achieve its goal of being the college of choice for interdisciplinary studies for students around 
the globe and to be completed with relatively little disturbance financially.  
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Appendix A: Financial and Common Data Set Information for Union and Peers 
 This appendix shows the numbers and ratios used to calculate the alphanumerical scores 
for to arrive at calculated preliminary ratings for Union and its peers. The first sheets are Union’s 
full financials from FY211 to FY16. The source is the Electronic Municipal Market Access 
website (EMMA), where all municipal issuers are required to post continuing disclosure 
information including annual financial statements. The next sheets are condensed financial 
information from FY14 to FY16 for Union’s peers. Information was also gathered from EMMA. 
Following this, there is information from Union and peer colleges’ common data set reports. 
Finally, is Moody’s rubric for assigning strategic positioning scores from its 2015 Global Higher 
Education Rating Methodology.
Balance	Sheet 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
Assets
Cash	and	Cash	equivalents	 3.661															 22.912													 27.137													 20.225													 26.776													 21.908													
Pledges	receivable,	net	 38.756													 17.691													 12.606													 16.007													 15.106													 12.942													
Notes	and	accounts	receivable,	net	 10.044													 10.689													 8.920															 9.381															 9.686															 9.741															
Deposits	with	bond	trustees 3.247															 4.525															 4.862															 4.275															 2.753															 2.849															
Other	assets 3.891															 4.165															 4.839															 5.465															 5.724															 11.429													
Investments	 428.128										 480.775										 455.111										 362.123										 319.523										 340.224										
Receivable	for	investments	sold	 79																				 3.000															 1.184															 2.505															 12.678													
Beneficial	interst	in	irrevocable	trusts 5.153															 5.419															 5.519															 5.062															 6.433															
Land,	builds,	and	equipment,	net 185.777										 163.089										 146.640										 146.988										 145.727										 143.817										
Total	Assets	 678.738										 712.266										 666.818										 572.031										 544.406										 542.912										
Liabili9es	and	net	Assets
Liabili9es	
Accounts	payable	and	accrued	expenes	 14.096													 13.316													 13.034													 11.780													 10.582													 10.154													
constructuPon	costs	payable	 1.730															 5.325															 700																		 461																		 676																		 828																		
deposits	and	advances	 2.397															 2.023															 1.998															 1.647															 1.386															 1.296															
pooled	life	income	and	charitable	giQ	annuiPPes	payable	 4.429															 4.545															 4.632															 4.781															 5.251															 69.603													
asset	rePrement	obligaPons 1.387															 1.488															 1.478															 1.638															 1.664															 5.354															
refundable	federal	student	loan	funds 2.357															 2.372															 2.401															 2.461															 2.474															 1.664															
accrued	postrePrement	benefits 13.271													 12.072													 10.607													 10.459													 11.604													 2.512															
Long-term	Debt 116.868										 120.366										 112.636										 74.049													 75.159													 9.604															
Total	Liabili9es 156.535										 161.508										 147.486										 107.276										 108.796										 101.014										
Net	Assets	
Unrestricted	 194.997										 216.019										 205.245										 190.376										 180.671										 186.681										
TemporaPly	restricted	 159.327										 170.041										 157.548										 122.610										 109.693										 115.499										
Permanently	restricted	 167.880										 164.698										 156.539										 151.769										 145.244										 139.717										
Total	net	assets	 522.203										 550.758										 519.332										 464.755										 435.609										 441.897										
total	liabi9es	and	net	assets 678.738										 712.266										 666.818										 572.031										 544.406										 542.912										
Income	Statement	
Opera9ng	Ac9vi9es	
TuiPon	and	fees 109.850										 105.943										 102.573										 97.821													 93.802													 89.700													
Room	and	Board 24.501													 23.321													 22.195													 21.815													 21.137													 19.277													
Less	student	aid (43.857)											 (41.646)											 (40.778)											 (39.839)											 (37.913)											 (36.571)											
Net	tuPPon	fees,	room	and	board 90.494													 87.618													 83.990													 79.796													 77.026													 72.406													
Investment	return 20.484													 18.809													 17.870													 16.585													 17.062													 19.704													
Government	grants 3.047															 2.092															 2.860															 2.920															 2.935															 3.323															
Private	giQs	and	grants 34.877													 20.015													 11.167													 11.941													 11.805													 10.382													
Intercollegiate	athlePcs	and	other	sources 4.996															 3.580															 2.288															 2.586															 3.573															 4.112															
Auxiliaries	enterprises 3.624															 3.865															 4.517															 4.384															 4.452															 5.057															
net	assets	released	from	restricPons
Total	revenue	and	reclassificaPons 157.521										 135.980										 122.691										 118.211										 116.853										 114.984										
Expenses
InstrucPnal	and	departmental	research 47.434													 46.819													 44.550													 43.083													 41.426													 40.489													
sponsored	research	programs 1.628															 980																		 1.246															 1.746															 914																		 1.035															
academic	support	 11.952													 11.120													 10.332													 9.670															 8.249															 9.174															
student	services 8.890															 8.775															 8.458															 7.967															 7.871															 7.812															
insPtuPonal	support 25.205													 23.515													 22.631													 21.411													 22.635													 19.835													
Auxiliaries	operaPons 23.393													 23.299													 22.861													 22.600													 21.765													 21.950													
Intercollegiate	athlePcs	and	other	sources 10.870													 11.586													 11.421													 10.828													 11.589													 10.131													
Total	Expenses 129.373										 126.092										 121.500										 117.304										 114.449										 110.425										
Increase	in	net	assets	from	operaPng	acPviPes	 28.149													 9.887															 1.191															 907																		 2.405															 4.559															
Endowment	and	other	net	Assets
Investment	return (40.270)											 32.285													 63.236													 34.327													 3.947															 48.421													
Endowment	gains	used	to	meet	spending	policy (18.570)											 (17.537)											 (14.781)											 (14.800)											 (15.325)											 (17.242)											
Private	giQs	and	grants 3.626															 8.347															 5.175															 6.926															 5.817															 3.688															
Other (579)																	 (1.556)														 (243)																	 1.786															 (1.229)														 513																		
Net	assets	released	from	restricPons (910)																	 (1.902)														
Increase	in	endowment	and	other	net	assets	 (56.703)											 21.538													 53.386													 28.239													 (8.693)														 35.379													
Increase	in	net	assets	from	operaPng	acPviPes	 (28.554)											 31.426													 54.577													 29.146													 (6.289)														 39.938													
Net	assets	at	begininning	of	year 550.758										 519.332										 464.755										 435.609										 441.897										 401.960										
Net	Assets	at	end	of	year 522.203										 550.758										 519.332										 464.755										 435.609										 441.897										
DepreciaPon 9.637															 9.409															 10.481													 10.864													 10.742													 9.966															
AmorPzaPon (2)																					 (96)																			 (17)																			 (39)																			 71																				 162																		
Interest 4.507															 5.244															 4.079															 2.690															 2.953															 2.821															
Total	debt 116.868										 120.366										 112.636										 74.049													 75.159													 69.603													
Ra9os	
OperaPng	Revenue	 157.521,23					 135.979,89					 122.690,85					 113.827,18					 112.401,72					 114.983,74					
Annual	Change	in	OperaPng	Revnue	 15,84															 10,83															 7,79																	 1,27																	 (2,25)																 #DIV/0!
OperaPng	Income 28.148,72							 9.887,48									 1.190,68									 (3.476,94)								 (2.047,00)								 4.558,81									
OperaPng	Cash	Flow	Margin 26,85															 17,98															 12,82															 8,82																	 10,43															 15,23															
Revenue	Diversity	 69,74															 77,91															 83,60															 85,94															 83,45															 78,01															
Total	Cash	and	Investments 431.789,41					 503.687,85					 482.248,34					 382.347,66					 346.299,57					 362.132,11					
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	OperaPng	Expenses	 3,64																	 4,13																	 4,07																	 3,40																	 3,16																	 3,40																	
Monthly	Days	Cash	on	Hand 594,43													 675,73													 674,79													 652,83													 635,88													 678,27													
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Total	Debt 2,59																	 2,96																	 3,00																	 3,33																	 2,88																	 3,38																	
Total	debt	to	Cash	Flow	 3,51																	 4,92																	 7,16																	 7,38																	 6,41																	 3,98																	
total	debt	to	cas	flow	with	debt 5,01																	
spendable	cash	and	investments	to	total	debt 1,81																	
Hamilton FY	2016 FY	2015 FY	2014
Net	assets	released	from	restric/ons -																				 -																				
total	revnue 133.834											 129.781											 127.779											
total	expenses 137.303											 134.423											 129.223											
deprecia/on	and	amor/za/on 16.987														 15.842														 14.573														
interest 2.990																 3.435																 3.291																
tu//on	and	fees 94.784														 93.261														 90.346														
cash	and	cash	equivelents 21.464														 25.316														 28.126														
investments 861.749											 919.578											 927.520											
pledges	recievable	net 1.009																 1.244																 1.209																
unrestricted	net	assets 249.027											 256.100											 230.615											
permenantely	restricted	net	assets 260.132											 238.509											 237.835											
total	debt 239.552											 244.133											 248.021											
endowment	2015 856.067											
endowment	2016 817.210											
change	in	endowment -5%
Ra3os	
Opera/ng	Revenue	 133.834											 129.781											 127.779											
Annual	Change	in	Opera/ng	Revnue	 3,122953283 1,566767622
Opera/ng	Income (3.469)														 (4.642)														 (1.444)														
Opera/ng	Cash	Flow	Margin 12,33468326 11,27668919 12,85031187
Revenue	Diversity	 70,82206315 71,86028772 70,70488891
Total	Cash	and	Investments 883.213											 944.894											 955.646											
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Opera/ng	Expenses	6,439932121 7,038512755 7,404680281
Monthly	Days	Cash	on	Hand 755,47														 788,29														 734,186437
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Total	Debt 2,605238111 2,898538911 2,899028711
Total	debt	to	Cash	Flow	 14,51126726 16,68144858 15,10481121
Hamilton:	Currently	(Aa2) Outcome Outcome
Scope	of	opera/ons A A
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power Baa Ba
Strategic	Posi/oning Aaa Aaa
Opera/ng	Results A A
Revenue	diversity Baa Baa
Total	wealth Aa Aa
Opera/ng	Reserve Aaa Aaa
liquidity Aaa Aaa
Financial	Leverage Aa Aa
Debt	afforability Baa Baa
Score Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 6 6
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 9 12
Strategic	Posi/oning 1 1
Opera/ng	Results 6 6
Revenue	diversity 9 9
Total	wealth 3 3
Opera/ng	Reserve 1 1
liquidity 1 1
Financial	Leverage 3 3
Debt	afforability 9 9
Weight Weight
Scope	of	opera/ons 15% 15%
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 5% 5%
Strategic	Posi/oning 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Results 10% 10%
Revenue	diversity 15% 15%
Total	wealth 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Reserve 10% 10%
liquidity 5% 5%
Financial	Leverage 10% 10%
Debt	afforability 10% 10%
Weighted	ScoreWeighted	Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 0,9 0,9
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 0,45 0,6
Strategic	Posi/oning 0,1 0,1
Opera/ng	Results 0,6 0,6
Revenue	diversity 1,35 1,35
Total	wealth 0,3 0,3
Opera/ng	Reserve 0,1 0,1
liquidity 0,05 0,05
Financial	Leverage 0,3 0,3
Debt	afforability 0,9 0,9
Total	Score 5,05 5,2
Preliminary	Outcome A1 A1
Franklin	and	Marshall FY	2016 FY	2015 FY	2014
Net	assets	released	from	restric/ons -																				 -																				 -																				
total	revnue 139.412											 136.606											 126961
total	expenses 136.203											 126.449											 122.920											
deprecia/on 14.292														 8.123																 8.036																
interest 4.384																 4.023																 4.130																
tu//on	and	fees 117.336											 113.126											 110.559											
cash	and	cash	equivelents 12.605														 4.123																 2.158																
investments 356.178											 393.571											 408.117											
pledges	recievable	net 33.387														 8.363																 6.565																
unrestricted	net	assets 246.049											 268.037											 280.616											
permenantely	restricted	net	assets 124.841											 117.847											 111.526											
total	debt 99.442														 79.108														 142.960											
endowment	2015 302.587											
endowment	2016 275.807											
change	in	endowment -9%
Ra3os	
Opera/ng	Revenue	 139.412											 136.606											 126.961											
Annual	Change	in	Opera/ng	Revnue	 2,054082544 7,596821071 #DIV/0!
Opera/ng	Income 3.209																 10.157														 4.041																
Opera/ng	Cash	Flow	Margin 15,69807477 16,32651567 12,76533739
Revenue	Diversity	 84,16492124 82,81188235 87,08107214
Total	Cash	and	Investments 368.783											 397.694											 410.275											
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Opera/ng	Expenses	2,952724977 3,211231406 3,391148715
Monthly	Days	Cash	on	Hand 736,67														 826,81														 891,5500853
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Total	Debt 2,788851793 3,643247206 2,135660325
Total	debt	to	Cash	Flow	 4,543842815 3,546966776 8,820879867
Franklin	and	Marshall:	Currently	(A1) Outcome Outcome
Scope	of	opera/ons A A
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power Baa Aa
Strategic	Posi/oning Aa Aa
Opera/ng	Results Aa Aa
Revenue	diversity Ba Ba
Total	wealth A A
Opera/ng	Reserve Aa Aa
liquidity Aaa Aaa
Financial	Leverage Aa Aa
Debt	afforability Aa Aa
Score Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 6 6
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 9 3
Strategic	Posi/oning 3 3
Opera/ng	Results 3 3
Revenue	diversity 12 12
Total	wealth 6 6
Opera/ng	Reserve 3 3
liquidity 1 1
Financial	Leverage 3 3
Debt	afforability 3 3
Weight Weight
Scope	of	opera/ons 15% 15%
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 5% 5%
Strategic	Posi/oning 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Results 10% 10%
Revenue	diversity 15% 15%
Total	wealth 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Reserve 10% 10%
liquidity 5% 5%
Financial	Leverage 10% 10%
Debt	afforability 10% 10%
Weighted	ScoreWeighted	Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 0,9 0,9
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 0,45 0,15
Strategic	Posi/oning 0,3 0,3
Opera/ng	Results 0,3 0,3
Revenue	diversity 1,8 1,8
Total	wealth 0,6 0,6
Opera/ng	Reserve 0,3 0,3
liquidity 0,05 0,05
Financial	Leverage 0,3 0,3
Debt	afforability 0,3 0,3
Total	Score 5,3 5
Preliminary	Outcome A1 A1
Bucknell	Unversity FY	2016 FY	2015 FY	2014
Net	assets	released	from	restric/ons
total	revnue 222.481											 213.256											 206389
total	expenses 219.237											 205.637											 200.780											
deprecia/on 18.462														 17.524														 16.611														
interest 5.625																 2.274																 2.349																
tu//on	and	fees 176.613											 170.879											 165.547											
cash	and	cash	equivelents 11.529														 21.276														 9.219																
investments 805.349											 819.817											 824.852											
pledges	recievable	net 4.022																 4.086																 4.042																
unrestricted	net	assets 388.183											 423.523											 430.600											
permenantely	restricted	net	assets 287.271											 261.448											 252.564											
total	debt 153.133											 157.855											 180.829											
endowment	2015 789.354											
endowment	2016 722.425											
change	in	endowment -8%
Ra3os	
Opera/ng	Revenue	 222.481											 213.256											 206.389											
Annual	Change	in	Opera/ng	Revnue	 4,325786848 3,327212206 #DIV/0!
Opera/ng	Income 3.244																 7.619																 5.609																
Opera/ng	Cash	Flow	Margin 12,28464453 12,85637919 11,9042197
Revenue	Diversity	 79,38340802 80,12857786 80,21115466
Total	Cash	and	Investments 816.878											 841.093											 834.071											
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Opera/ng	Expenses	 3,74						 											 4,11																		 4,174285287
Monthly	Days	Cash	on	Hand 705,70														 821,77														 853,3955226
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Total	Debt 3,484742022 3,697893637 3,238136582
Total	debt	to	Cash	Flow	 5,602905126 5,757559179 7,360047214
Bucknell:	Currently	(Aa2) Outcome Outcome
Scope	of	opera/ons A A
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power A Baa
Strategic	Posi/oning Aa Aa
Opera/ng	Results A A
Revenue	diversity Ba Ba
Total	wealth Aa Aa
Opera/ng	Reserve Aa Aa
liquidity Aaa Aaa
Financial	Leverage Aa Aa
Debt	afforability Aa Aa
Score Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 6 6
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 6 9
Strategic	Posi/oning 3 3
Opera/ng	Results 6 6
Revenue	diversity 12 12
Total	wealth 3 3
Opera/ng	Reserve 3 3
liquidity 1 1
Financial	Leverage 3 3
Debt	afforability 3 3
Weight Weight
Scope	of	opera/ons 15% 15%
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 5% 5%
Strategic	Posi/oning 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Results 10% 10%
Revenue	diversity 15% 15%
Total	wealth 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Reserve 10% 10%
liquidity 5% 5%
Financial	Leverage 10% 10%
Debt	afforability 10% 10%
Weighted	ScoreWeighted	Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 0,9 0,9
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 0,3 0,45
Strategic	Posi/oning 0,3 0,3
Opera/ng	Results 0,6 0,6
Revenue	diversity 1,8 1,8
Total	wealth 0,3 0,3
Opera/ng	Reserve 0,3 0,3
liquidity 0,05 0,05
Financial	Leverage 0,3 0,3
Debt	afforability 0,3 0,3
Total	Score 5,15 5,3
Preliminary	Outcome A1 A1
Colby	College FY	2016 FY	2015 FY	2014
Net	assets	released	from	restric/ons
total	revnue 139.950											 128.644											 120664
total	expenses 136.769											 127.795											 116.458											
deprecia/on 10.490														 9.442																 8.118																
interest 7.423																 2.231																 3.023																
tu//on	and	fees 116.542											 111.549											 106.576											
cash	and	cash	equivelents 31.817														 7.060																 19.331														
investments 893.587											 936.774											 829.344											
pledges	recievable	net 18.905														 21.769														 21.166														
unrestricted	net	assets 358.054											 366.541											 363.925											
permenantely	restricted	net	assets 394.822											 384.445											 375.333											
total	debt 202.854											 205.997											 106.477											
endowment	2015 745.957											
endowment	2016 710.659											
change	in	endowment -5%
Ra3os	
Opera/ng	Revenue	 139.950											 128.644											 120.664											
Annual	Change	in	Opera/ng	Revnue	 8,788594882 6,613405821 #DIV/0!
Opera/ng	Income 3.181																 849																			 4.206																
Opera/ng	Cash	Flow	Margin 15,0725259 9,733839122 12,71878937
Revenue	Diversity	 83,27402644 86,71138957 88,32460386
Total	Cash	and	Investments 925.404											 943.834											 848.675											
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Opera/ng	Expenses	6,904408163 7,555874643 7,469139089
Monthly	Days	Cash	on	Hand 1034,928294 1130,410425 1226,071857
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Total	Debt 2,708780699 2,821196425 4,644270594
Total	debt	to	Cash	Flow	 9,616668247 16,45080658 6,937968333
Colby:	Currently	(Aa2) Outcome Outcome
Scope	of	opera/ons A A
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power Aaa Aa
Strategic	Posi/oning Aaa Aa
Opera/ng	Results Aa A
Revenue	diversity Ba Ba
Total	wealth Aa Aa
Opera/ng	Reserve Aaa Aaa
liquidity Aaa Aaa
Financial	Leverage Aa Aa
Debt	afforability A Baa
Score Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 6 6
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 1 3
Strategic	Posi/oning 1 3
Opera/ng	Results 3 6
Revenue	diversity 12 12
Total	wealth 3 3
Opera/ng	Reserve 1 1
liquidity 1 1
Financial	Leverage 3 3
Debt	afforability 6 9
Weight Weight
Scope	of	opera/ons 15% 15%
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 5% 5%
Strategic	Posi/oning 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Results 10% 10%
Revenue	diversity 15% 15%
Total	wealth 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Reserve 10% 10%
liquidity 5% 5%
Financial	Leverage 10% 10%
Debt	afforability 10% 10%
Weighted	ScoreWeighted	Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 0,9 0,9
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 0,05 0,15
Strategic	Posi/oning 0,1 0,3
Opera/ng	Results 0,3 0,6
Revenue	diversity 1,8 1,8
Total	wealth 0,3 0,3
Opera/ng	Reserve 0,1 0,1
liquidity 0,05 0,05
Financial	Leverage 0,3 0,3
Debt	afforability 0,6 0,9
Total	Score 4,5 5,4
Preliminary	Outcome Aa3 A1
Bates	College FY	2016 FY	2015 FY	2014
Net	assets	released	from	restric/ons
total	revnue 110.628											 109.986											 101349,408
total	expenses 104.575											 103.404											 100.958											
deprecia/on 6.608																 6.550																 6.527																
interest 4.864																 5.176																 3.438																
tu//on	and	fees 109.765											 106.426											 72.520														
cash	and	cash	equivelents 17.870														 12.460														 10.417														
investments 289.478											 301.732											 302.654											
pledges	recievable	net 1.912																 2.404																 2.047																
unrestricted	net	assets 124.088											 122.922											 121.418											
permenantely	restricted	net	assets 181.129											 158.439											 153.675											
total	debt 99.765														 101.470											 109.373											
endowment	2015 261.501											
endowment	2016 250.976											
change	in	endowment -4%
Ra3os	
Opera/ng	Revenue	 110.628											 109.986											 101.349											
Annual	Change	in	Opera/ng	Revnue	 0,583597665 8,521815934 #DIV/0!
Opera/ng	Income 6.053																 6.582																 392																			
Opera/ng	Cash	Flow	Margin 15,84124539 16,64511275 10,2188737
Revenue	Diversity	 99,22019176 96,76286169 71,55416339
Total	Cash	and	Investments 307.347											 314.191											 313.071											
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Opera/ng	Expenses	2,957311604 3,061721007 3,121282132
Monthly	Days	Cash	on	Hand 462,3191785 463,2357176 469,3128827
Spendable	Cash	and	Investments	to	Total	Debt 1,284331768 1,558642242 1,476067883
Total	debt	to	Cash	Flow	 5,692753349 5,542614953 10,56056851
Bates:	Currently	(A1) Outcome Outcome
Scope	of	opera/ons A A
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power Ba Aaa
Strategic	Posi/oning A A
Opera/ng	Results Aa Aa
Revenue	diversity Ca Caa
Total	wealth A A
Opera/ng	Reserve Aa Aa
liquidity Aa Aa
Financial	Leverage A A
Debt	afforability Aa Aa
Score Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 6 6
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 12 1
Strategic	Posi/oning 6 6
Opera/ng	Results 3 3
Revenue	diversity 20 18
Total	wealth 6 6
Opera/ng	Reserve 3 3
liquidity 3 3
Financial	Leverage 6 6
Debt	afforability 3 3
Weight Weight
Scope	of	opera/ons 15% 15%
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 5% 5%
Strategic	Posi/oning 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Results 10% 10%
Revenue	diversity 15% 15%
Total	wealth 10% 10%
Opera/ng	Reserve 10% 10%
liquidity 5% 5%
Financial	Leverage 10% 10%
Debt	afforability 10% 10%
Weighted	ScoreWeighted	Score
Scope	of	opera/ons 0,9 0,9
Reputa/on	and	Pricing	Power 0,6 0,05
Strategic	Posi/oning 0,6 0,6
Opera/ng	Results 0,3 0,3
Revenue	diversity 3 2,7
Total	wealth 0,6 0,6
Opera/ng	Reserve 0,3 0,3
liquidity 0,15 0,15
Financial	Leverage 0,6 0,6
Debt	afforability 0,3 0,3
Total	Score 7,35 6,5
Preliminary	Outcome A3 A2
Applications Union Bates F&M Bucknell Hamilton
15 - 16 5996 5651 7146 10487 5230
14 - 15 5406 5044 5472 10967 5434
13 - 14 5725 5243 5347 7864 5071
12 - 13 5565 4906 5174 7947 5107
11 - 12 5151 5196 5105 8291 5265
Number Accepted Union Bates F&M Bucknell Hamilton
15 - 16 2297 1231 2305 3138 1364
14 - 15 2223 1282 2130 2718 1348
13 - 14 2134 1267 1936 2416 1336
12 - 13 2127 1304 2034 2345 1389
11 - 12 2197 1405 1965 2238 1441
Total enrolled Union Bates F&M Bucknell Hamilton
15 - 16 568 517 592 950 472
14 - 15 570 491 591 938 473
13 - 14 559 500 605 939 469
12 - 13 591 503 600 933 469
11 - 12 572 502 597 918 481
Selectivity Union Bates F&M Bucknell Hamilton
15 - 16 38,31% 21,78% 32,26% 29,92% 26,08%
14 - 15 41,12% 25,42% 38,93% 24,78% 24,81%
13 - 14 37,28% 24,17% 36,21% 30,72% 26,35%
12 - 13 38,22% 26,58% 39,31% 29,51% 27,20%
11 - 12 42,65% 27,04% 38,49% 26,99% 27,37%
Matriculation Union Bates F&M Bucknell Hamilton
15 - 16 24,73% 42,00% 25,68% 30,27% 34,60%
14 - 15 25,64% 38,30% 27,75% 34,51% 35,09%
13 - 14 26,19% 39,46% 31,25% 38,87% 35,10%
12 - 13 27,79% 38,57% 29,50% 39,79% 33,77%
11 - 12 26,04% 35,73% 30,38% 41,02% 33,38%
% increase yr over yr Union Bates F&M Bucknell Hamilton
15 - 16 10,91% 12,03% 30,59% -4,38% -3,75%
14 - 15 -5,57% -3,80% 2,34% 39,46% 7,16%
13 - 14 2,88% 6,87% 3,34% -1,04% -0,70%
12 - 13 8,04% -5,58% 1,35% -4,15% -3,00%
Overall % increase 16,40% 8,76% 39,98% 26,49% -0,66%
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